3. The commencement and growth of the other view—the view which understands the expression to exclude from the offices of pastor and deacon in the church any one who might have re-married after having lost a wife by death—furnishes an additional argument in favour of our interpretation. For the history of church opinion and practice on the subject puts it beyond a doubt, that the more natural view was abandoned only when a false asceticism began to flow in upon the church, and an ideal of piety unwarranted in Scripture, and at variance with the flesh and blood relations which God has established for men in this life. It is hot till near the end of the second century that the ascetic spirit makes its appearance as a disturbing element in this particular line; and when it does so, the perverting influence discovers itself in respect to the members generally of the Christian church, not specifically to those who were called to discharge any spiritual function. It may be questioned whether the Plea of Athenagoras or The Shepherd of Hermas had, in point of time, precedence of the other. Probably they were nearly contemporaneous; and they are the earliest extant of the Patristic writings which can be referred to on the present subject. Athenagoras is often erroneously adduced as a witness for the other view; for when the passage in his Plea is correctly explained, it has respect to bigamy in the proper sense. “A person (he says) should either remain as he was born, or be content with one marriage; for the second marriage (
ï
̔
äåõ
́
ôåñïò ãá
́
ìïò
) is only a specious adultery. ‘For whosoever puts away his wife (says He), and marries another, commits adultery,’—neither permitting a man to put her away whose virginity he has made to cease, nor to marry another (
ïõ
̓
äå å
̓
ðéãáìåé
͂
í
). For he who deprives himself of his first wife, even though she be dead, is a veiled adulterer, resisting the hand of God” (c. 33). The thought is somewhat loosely expressed, but the reason assigned for the judgment given clearly shows that the second marriage contemplated by the writer is one contracted under the forms of law, after an improper divorce had been effected against a first wife. In such a case a second marriage was justly held to be from the first vitiated—essentially adulterous; and this for all Christians alike, without respect to official distinctions. The passage in The Shepherd is more to the point: “If a wife or husband die, and the widower or widow marry, does he or she commit sin? There is no sin in marrying again, said he; but if they remain unmarried, they gain greater honour and glory from the Lord; yet if they marry, they do not commit sin” (Com. iv. c. 3). This also has respect to the Christian life generally, and makes but a slight advance upon the teaching of Scripture; for there both our Lord and St. Paul speak of the resolution to abstain from marriage as, in certain circumstances, and with a view to more entire devotedness to the service of God, an indication of spiritual excellence beyond what would be exhibited by a different course. Only here the married state is apparently contemplated more apart, as in itself, especially when entered into a second time, incompatible with the higher degrees of honour in the divine kingdom. It was still but an incipient indication of the leaven which had begun to work. A stage further on, and we meet with greatly more marked symptoms of its operation.
This stage had its commencement with the rise of that pretentious Gnosticism which, especially from about the middle of the second century, in the hands of the Encratites (Tatian and Marcion), sought to elevate the tone of Christianity, and raise the ideal of Christian perfection higher than was done by the acknowledged teachers of Christianity. According to this school, true perfection consisted in working one’s self free from the ordinary relations and enjoyments of life: marriage, which formed the common basis of these, was esteemed a kind of service of the devil, utterly at variance with the higher aims of the spiritual life; the “elect “spirits must have nothing to do with it, and must also abstain from the use of flesh and wine, and give themselves to fastings and other kinds of bodily mortification. The real tendency of this Gnostic spiritualism did not quite immediately discover itself; it pressed at various points as a reforming influence into the church; and in some of its more characteristic features it ere long burst forth with great power among the excitable and enthusiastic Christians of Phrygia in the guise of Montanism. Montanus and his followers did not profess, indeed, to stand in any proper affinity to Christians of the Gnostic type; but they so far coincided with them as to aim at introducing a new and higher style of Christianity, and one that partook largely of Gnostic elements. Having received (as they imagined) the fuller afflatus of the Spirit promised by Christ, they had attained to the position of right truly spiritual Christians; were the pneumatics (
ðíåõìáôéêïé
́
), while others, if Christians at all, were but psychical or carnal (
øõ÷éêïé
́
); and, in proof of their nobler elevation, they renounced not only the pleasures and luxuries, but also most of the comforts of life—fasted oft, and rigidly; courted indignities, self-denials, persecutions; disparaged marriage, and stigmatized second marriages as fornication. Though the movement was opposed by all the leading authorities in the church, and the claim to supernatural guidance was on every hand rejected, yet many were impressed by the apparent elevation and moral strength of the party; and the opinion grew, that the more select class of Christians should cultivate the ascetic virtues, and should either remain in cœlibacy, or at most be but once married. The tendency of Christian thought and practice in this direction received a great impulse from Tertullian, who not only imbibed the distinctive principles of Montanism, but threw himself into the advocacy of them with zeal and energy. On the subject of marriage he occupied what he called middle ground—between those (the Encratites) who repudiated marriage altogether, as a thing inherently evil, and the Psychical party, who maintained the lawfulness of the married state, even when entered into anew after the death of a previous wife. He contended for the absolute singleness of the marriage union, pressing all sorts of considerations into his argument; such as that the first Adam had but one spouse (Eve), the second also but one (the church); that death does not entirely destroy the union of married parties, since the soul still lives, in which the more vital seat of the union resides; that at the resurrection, though there shall be no more marrying, but an angelic state of being, yet those who have been married on earth shall recognise each other as such, etc. (De Monog., and Ad Uxorem, L. i.). By considerations like these, Tertullian reaches the conclusion that in no case is more than a single marriage allowable for a Christian, while the state of cœlibacy is to be preferred as one of higher sanctity. He admits that in 1Co_7:39 the apostle grants liberty of re-marrying to those who had been deprived of a spouse by death, if only they married in the Lord; but he thinks this had respect to such merely as had been first married in heathenism, so that their union was no marriage in the Christian sense. He also admits that the principle laid down at the beginning of Romans 7 as to death severing the marriage tie, and leaving the survivor free to marry again without being guilty of adultery, is at variance with the view maintained and advocated by him; but finds his escape in the new revelation of Montanism, that as Christ had taken away the liberty which Moses allowed to the Israelites because of the hardness of their hearts, so the Paraclete now takes away what Christ and Paul allowed on account of the infirmity of the flesh, in order that the original ideal of marriage might be restored. So that he concludes second marriages are contrary to the will of Christ—not lawful—next thing to adultery (juxia adulterium; De Monog. c. xi.-xv.).
In the course of this strange piece of argumentation, the passages 1Ti_3:2, Tit_1:6, are naturally brought into consideration, and the expression husband of one wife is held, without question, to denote a person only once married: those who married a second time are termed digami, bigamists—the first time that such an explanation, followed by such an application of the term, occurs in any Christian writing. (The word is found in Justin’s Apology, c. i. 15, but in the usual sense of separating from one wife and marrying another.) Tertullian’s argument from the passages is this: The apostle requires of those who hold clerical functions in the church, that they be no more than once married; but this cannot be confined to them, no more than any of the other moral qualifications mentioned in the same connection: if the rest are common to them with believers generally, why should not this also? Or if the clergy alone have to do with this, then they, too, alone must be subject to the discipline of the rest. And is it not the doctrine of Scripture, that all genuine believers are of priestly rank, having one and the same spiritual standing, the same high and holy calling, with official distinctions only for orderly administrations? Here, undoubtedly, Tertullian got hold of a right principle, though he utterly misapplied it; for it is against the fundamental principles of the gospel (as already indicated) to have class distinctions as to moral attainments—to set up one type of purity or holiness for the pastor, and another for the flock. And it betrayed a departure from the simple faith and true spirit of Christianity when the authorities in the church began, as they did about or shortly after Tertullian’s time, to hold that it was allowable for common believers, but not for Christian ministers, to enter a second time into a marriage relationship. This was really to change the constitution of Christ’s spiritual kingdom.
The influence of Tertullian’s writings on this subject, as on many others, operated far and wide throughout the church, though he failed to carry the formal sanction of his views. In various quarters, second marriages, even among the laity, came to be viewed with disfavour, and were occasionally subjected to a measure of disciplinary treatment. Thus, in one of the canons of the provincial synod of Neo-Caesarea (A.D. 314), priests are forbidden to countenance the festivities of second marriages by their presence, “since the bigamus needed penitence.” (Thus early did the ecclesiastical use of the word bigamus become distinguished from the civil, in which it always denotes one married to two spouses still living.) The Council of Nicæa sought to interpose a check on this foolish restriction, and required (in its 8th canon) that the cathari, or purists, on being received into the church, should formally consent to communicate with such as had been married a second time. Yet a provincial council at Laodicea, held about a quarter of a century later (A.D. 352), ordained, in its very first canon, that persons legally marrying a second time should be received into communion only after fasting and prayer, and juxta indidgentiam. The general sense of the church, however, successfully withstood the ascetic tendency in this form of its manifestation; but only that it might be made to concentrate itself upon the select class of the priesthood, in respect to whom the feeling continued to grow that the normal condition was one of entire separation from married life, and that disqualification for clerical ministrations was consequent on a second marriage, especially if the second had been entered into after baptism. A rule to this effect is laid down in the so-called Apostolical Canons, which, though bearing a false title, undoubtedly expressed the general mind of the church about the close of the fourth century. They ordained, among other grounds of exception, that no one who had become involved in second marriages after baptism, or who had married a widow (this being also on one side a second marriage), could be admitted to any grade of priestly standing (Can. 17, 18). In like manner Ambrose, while distinctly asserting that the -apostolic precepts do not condemn second marriages (De Vid. c. 2, § 10), yet maintains that they were rightly held to be inconsistent with priestly functions (according to the prescription in 1Ti_3:2), and for this among other reasons, that there should not be one rule for the clergy and the people; that the former, as they stood on a higher spiritual eminence, should be held bound to a more perfect mode of life (Ep. ad Vercell. Ecclesiam, § 62-64. To the same effect also Innocent of Rome, De Cr. 13; and Epiphanius, Haer. 48).
Yet, with all this countenance from some of the more prominent authorities of the church, and the steady growth of public sentiment in the same direction, the practice in many places but slowly conformed to what the ascetic spirit, in this alliance with caste distinctions and ritualistic services, demanded as right and proper. Theodoret (whose comment on St. Paul’s expression was formerly given) mentions, in a letter to Domnus of Antioch (Ep. 110), that he had ordained one Irenaeus, though he had entered into marriage a second time; and that in doing so he had but “followed the footsteps of those who had gone before him.” He refers also to various examples of the same kind. And the frequency of the practice, coupled with the impropriety, or rather the palpable indecency, of the church’s commonly recognised procedure in excluding from sacred ministrations those who had lawfully entered into wedlock a second time, while persons guilty of concubinage and the grossest immoralities were freely admitted, is denounced by Jerome, in his own peculiar style, when commenting on a case of the former description in his letter to Oceanus. “I wonder,” says Jerome to his correspondent, “that you should think of dragging forth one bishop as having transgressed the apostolic rule, since the whole world is full of these ordinations: I don’t mean of presbyters, or those of inferior grade, but I come to bishops, of whom I could unroll such a list as would exceed in number the members of the synod of Ariminum.” He then refers to a disputation he had with an eloquent man at Rome on the subject, whose syllogistic reasoning he met by a counter reasoning of the same kind; and then he adds: “It is a new thing I hear, that what was not sin shall be reckoned for sin. All sorts of prostitutions, and the filth of public abominations, impiety towards God, acts of parricide, of incest, etc., are purged away in the font of Christ. Shall the stains of a wife still inhere, and brothels be preferred to the marriage-bed? I do not cast up to you troops of harlots, lots of catamites, shedding of blood, and swinish indulgences at every feast; and you bring up to me from the sepulchre a wife long since dead, whom I received lest I should do what you have done! Let the Gentiles hear it; let the catechumens, who are candidates for the faith, lest they marry wives before baptism, lest they enter into honourable matrimony, but may have wives and children in common—nay, may shun the term wife in every form, lest, after they have believed in Christ, it shall prove to their detriment that they had wives, and not concubines or harlots.”
Such were the factitious distinctions and the mischievous results which grew out of this unscriptural mode of teaching which the church received mainly at the hands of Tertullian, after he had assumed the heretical position of a Montanist. The view ultimately became associated nearly as much with false notions of the ministry and of the sacraments, as with unwarranted restrictions regarding marriage. And as the development in that direction could not be deemed otherwise than natural, if the principle had been sound on which it proceeded,—that a species of sanctity incompatible with second marriages was required of pastors and deacons which is not required of believers generally,—the development itself may fairly be regarded as a proof of the unsoundness of the principle. Doctrinally, it was wrong; but in a practical respect also, the view could not fail to be accompanied with serious embarrassment or trouble of a domestic kind. Pastors bereaved by death of their wives, and without any female relative to supply the blank, would often find it impossible to have their children properly cared for, and their households ruled well (according to apostolic precept), except by entering anew into married life. And to interdict this would necessarily have forced on them the painful alternative of either perilling the moral well-being of their family, or, to avoid that, renouncing their position as ministers of God’s word.
4. There remains still another line of reflection to strengthen the interpretation given—this, namely, that in addition to the objections which have been urged against understanding the expression of absolute monogamy, the other view affords a perfectly good and appropriate meaning. Recent interpreters have sometimes denied this, and laid considerable stress on the opposite allegation. Thus Alford: “The apostle would hardly have specified that as a requisite for the episcopate or presbyterate which we know to have been fulfilled by all Christians whatever; no instance being adduced of polygamy being practised in the Christian church, and no exhortation to abstain from it.” If this were anything like a fair and full representation of the matter, it would be hard to account for so many of the early interpreters (conversant, as they were, with the circumstances of the time) taking the other view of the passage, and thinking that, as matters then stood alike among the Jews and Gentiles, ample grounds existed for insisting on monogamy in the ordinary sense—monogamy in contradistinction simply to polygamy and divorce—as a qualification for office in the church. A certain proportion of its membership consisted of converts from Judaism; and though divorce, perhaps, on insufficient grounds, and subsequent marriage, or the undisguised practice of polygamy, might not be very common in the gospel age among the Jews, yet there is not wanting evidence to show that usages of that description did exist, and continued for ages after the Christian era, Justin Martyr charges it as matter of just reproach against the teachers of the Jewish people, that even till now they permitted each man to have four or five wives (Tryphio, c. 134). And in the year A.D. 393 a law was passed by Theodosius, enjoining that “none of the Jews should retain their own custom in marriage, nor enter into diverse marriage relationships at one time” (nec in diversa sub uno tempore conjugia conveniat),—a law which is not likely to have been enacted without adequate reasons for it, and still less to have been re-enacted, as it was by Justinian a century and a half later. It will readily be understood, that if persons, who in their unchristian state had become entangled in such double or treble marriage relationships, might be admitted, on their conversion, to the communion of the church, they should still not be entrusted with the spiritual administration of its affairs: there was a flaw in their condition which unfitted them for being unexceptionable guides and overseers of the flock. It is notorious, also, that among the Greeks and Romans, although polygamy was not formally sanctioned, yet it virtually prevailed—prevailed under the connivance or sanction of law; and that the most deplorable and wide-spread laxity in this respect existed, both previous to the apostolic age and for long after it. In the later stages of the Republic, with the influx of wealth and luxury, a fearful degeneracy of manners made way among the higher classes of society; many shunned the restraints of marriage, and with those who entered into the bond it was often little more than a temporary contract. Divorce was so common, that “public opinion ceased to frown on it; it could be initiated by husband or wife with almost equal freedom: there was a ready consent of both parties to the separation, in the prospect of marrying again; and this facility was open to all classes who could contract marriage.” (Dr. Thos. D. Woolsey On Divorce and Divorce Legislation, p. 41.) It was even open to them to do it without any legal process; for, as another authority on the subject tells us, “among the Romans divorce did not require the sentence of a judge; no judicial proceedings were necessary. It was considered a private act, though some distinct notice or declaration of intention was usual.” (Lord Mackenzie On Roman Law, part i. c. 6.)
This great social evil, instead of abating, grew with the introduction of the Empire, and received a powerful stimulus from the scandalous excesses of persons in high places. The two first Cæsars set here an example which was only too closely followed by many of their successors and underlings. Female manners became so loose, that no woman (Seneca could say) “was now ashamed of divorce; and illustrious and noble ladies counted their years, not by the number of consuls, but by the number of their husbands.” Hence also the bitter sarcasm of Juvenal: