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Appendix D, Page 82: Views Of Earlier Reformed Theologians On The Conditional Element In Prophecy
THE discussion respecting the conditional element in prophecy purposely conducted, without any distinct reference to the views advanced by the more orthodox and systematic divines of former times: chiefly because such a reference must either have rendered the discussion unduly protracted and polemical, or must have been so brief, as to admit of being readily perverted or misunderstood,—a fate that befel the very brief allusion which was made to them in the first edition The theological writers more particularly referred to were the Calvinists of the 17th century, the great defenders and expounders of the faith, who looked only incidentally at the points here more immediately in question, and looked at them in a doctrinal rather than an exegetical respect. Their more special object in referring to them was to vindicate the divine authority of revelation, and the orthodoxy of its higher truths against conclusions apt to be drawn from apparent failures in prophetical announcements; not to find their way to correct principles of prophetical interpretation, or to determine the proper place and bearing of prophecy in the history of God’s dispensations. Hence they too often appear, in such parts of their writings, to be standing merely on the defensive, and not unfrequently drawing distinctions, which seem invented for the occasion, and are more fitted to embarrass than to promote the intelligent study of prophecy.
Stillingfleet’s “Origines Sacrae” may be taken as a fair specimen of this mode of treating prophecy by the writers now under consideration. Viewing prophecy with respect merely to the supernatural insight and veracity of the persons inditing it, the author had to account for the fact that prophetic announcements were not always strictly fulfilled, and it hence became necessary to distinguish between prophecies “revealing the internal counsels and decrees of God’s will,” and prophecies merely indicating “the method and series of his providence in the administration of things in the world.” For determining those of the former class,—those, namely, of an absolute character—four specific marks of distinction are assigned. (1.) The first is the accompanying of the prediction with a present miracle, by which, as by a visible seal from Heaven, it was authenticated as a revelation of God’s fixed purpose, or secret will—a mark, however, which was of a merely circumstantial kind, and a mark besides, which was so rarely given (one example only being noticed, 1Ki_13:3), that it contributes nothing worth naming to the general result. (2.) Again, predictions are to be understood absolutely “when the things foretold exceed all probabilities of second causes,” such as the predicted deliverance first from Egypt, and afterwards from Babylon, the only instances referred to by Stillingfleet in proof of the distinction. But we may surely ask, Did the promised deliverance from Egypt lie more beyond the probability of second causes than the promised introduction of the persons delivered into the land of Canaan? Or, was the threatened overthrow of Babylon for the subsequent release and return of the Jewish captives less probable when viewed with respect to the operation of second causes, than the earlier prediction, announced by Jonah, of the destruction of Nineveh in forty days? No one could venture to assert the affirmative of these questions; and yet, of the two pairs of predictions now mentioned, much apparently on a level as regards natural probability, one in each proved to be not a revelation of God’s absolute will in the sense of Dr Stillingfleet, while the other did. His second mark of distinction, therefore, is destitute of any solid foundation, and does not touch the real grounds of difference. Who, indeed, can tell, amid the hidden, intricate, curiously-interconnected movements of Providence, what events of the remote future lie within, or beyond the probabilities of second causes? In such matters human sagacity is an insufficient guide, and can furnish no proper criterion. (3.) A third distinction given is, that “predictions which are confirmed by an oath from God himself, express the immutable determination of his will.’’ True, certainly, as to the fact; for the two or three predictions which were so confirmed were literally fulfilled (Num_14:28; Psa_89:31-36; Heb_6:17). Yet, as in the case of the first class, this is a merely circumstantial distinction—a difference only in the mode of announcement, and one adopted in accommodation to human infirmity, not of itself indicative of any inherent peculiarity in the matter of the predictions. Their actual verification must have resulted rather from their essential character than from that incidental accompaniment. (4.) Lastly, “predictions concerning blessings merely spiritual (it is affirmed) do express God’s eternal purpose;” and for this reason, “because the bestowing of such blessings doth immediately flow from the grace and favour of God, and depend not upon conditions on our part.” In one sense this is true, but in another not—not as it requires to be understood in its present application. The most approved defenders of the doctrines of grace have readily owned that many promises, or predictions of spiritual good, are conditional (for ex. Turretine Inst. Loc. iii., Q. 16, § 14, 19); and consequently depend for their fulfilment on the existence of the condition. The Bible abounds with such conditional announcements. The Sermon on the Mount opens with a whole series of them. And, to go farther back, was there nothing spiritual in the promised settlement of the ransomed Israelites in Canaan (Exo_32:34)—a word with which inspired writers identified the very sum of all spiritual blessings, “entering into God’s rest,” (Psa_95:2; Heb_3:11-19)— though it proved in such a sense conditional as to fail in the case of those to whom it was immediately given through their unbelief. Or, was there nothing spiritual in the covenant of promise made with David’s house and seed? In truth, the prophetic word itself knows of no such distinction as between spiritual and temporal in the promise and bestowal of blessing; for, in Old Testament times, the two constantly went more or less together; and it may justly be affirmed, that a simply temporal or a simply spiritual good never constituted the exclusive theme of any prophetic announcement made to the covenant people.
It thus appears, that the distinctive marks given by Stillingfleet of the higher or absolute species of predictions (and we know no writer of his age that gives them better) are of no real value. They bear unmistakable evidence of having been fallen upon primarily as weapons of defence, and were but casually intended to bear upon the subject of prophetic interpretation. There inadequacy in the one respect, however, necessarily renders them of little avail in the other; and a skilful adversary might readily have served himself of them in impugning the authority of Scripture.
It could scarcely be expected, that when our author failed so palpably in the one branch of his subject, he should have been successful when turning to the other. Accordingly, the directions he gives for ascertaining what predictions are not expressive of the final determinations or secret will of God, discover their insufficiency on a moment’s consideration. He has here just two leading positions; one of them having respect to predictions of temporal blessing; these, he considers, always involve the condition of obedience, so that the event “could not be fulfilled when the people did not perform their condition”—which is true, no doubt, as regards the class of predictions in question, but assuredly not on account of the simply temporal nature of the blessings indicated in the prophetic word; for, as already stated, there were no such prophecies, and, in the nature of things, the temporal could never in this way be distinguished from the spiritual gifts of God’s goodness. Stillingfleet’s other rule is, that threatenings, or “comminations of judgments to come do not of themselves speak the absolute futurity of the event;” and for this reason, “because comminations confer no right to any, which absolute promises do; and therefore God is not bound to necessary performance of what he threatens.” This is a favourite distinction of the period (though some reject it, as Rivet in Genes. Exerc. 51, and Charnock on God’s Immutability, III., prop. 4); and we find it particularly pressed by another, writer (Gale), who says, “Promises give a right to the persons to whom they are made, which cannot be taken from them without injury; for albeit it be free to any to make a promise, yet having made it, his fidelity is obliged to see it performed. So that in promises there is no room for relaxation or dispensation. . . But as to comminations or threats, no right or debt accrues to the persons to whom they are made, save only a debt or merit of punishment. Yet in many cases, especially as to circumstances, the superior, who made the law, and affixed a threat thereto, has a liberty of relaxing, or dispensing with the penalty of his law,” etc.—(“Court of the Gentiles,” P. IV., B. II,, c. 6, § 2. See also Owen on Heb., vol. iv., p. 268.) As if the right of a creature were more binding on God than a regard to the verity of his own word! Or, as if his threatenings of judgment were not, equally with his promises of blessing, the expression of his character towards persons standing in specific relations to him! As if, indeed, they were no more than arbitrary announcements, which he could send forth, or recal at pleasure! This surely, is a strange mode of vindicating the divine honour and faithfulness; especially strange in those whose Calvinism bound them to seek the ultimate ground of all God’s dealings in the eternal principles of His own nature, or the counsel of His will! It would never have been thought of, had it not presented itself as a convenient method of escape from a polemical difficulty. There is more, however, than this against it; for (as already stated in the section to which this note is appended) the greater part of God’s comminations of judgment in the prophetic Scriptures are really indirect promises of good to the true children of the covenant. The first promise itself, on which all hope for fallen man was built, took the form of a threatening against the adversary; and, generally, the denunciations of coming judgment on ungodly nations and individuals are but the reverse aspect of God’s covenant-love and faithfulness to His people. So that to distinguish in the way now under consideration between threatenings and promises, as if the one were in their own nature less closely connected with the secret will of God than the other, is to take but a superficial view of the matter; it betokens a defective insight into the structure of prophecy. The fundamental element for such distinctions is wanting, so long as due account fails to be made of the relation of prophecy to God’s moral nature, on the one hand, and men’s responsibilities on the other.
Yet with so many crude, superficial, arbitrary positions on the subject, there are not wanting some, who can point to Stillingfleet, and writers of his stamp and age, as authorities regarding it—safe and skilful guides in distinguishing between the absolute and the conditional in its predictions!! Such appeals may serve a purpose; but it can never be the purpose of promoting the unbiassed study and sound interpretation of prophetical Scripture.